Coevolution in management fashion: an agent-based model of consultant-driven innovation by Strang, David et al.
AlCoevolution in Management Fashion: An Agent-
Based Model of Consultant-Driven Innovation1David Strang
Cornell University
Robert J. David
McGill University
Saeed Akhlaghpour
Middlesex University London
The rise of management consultancy has been accompanied by increas-
ingly marked faddish cycles in management techniques, but the mech-
anisms that underlie this relationship are not well understood. The1 Prev
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l use suauthors develop a simple agent-based framework that models inno-
vation adoption and abandonment on both the supply and demand
sides. In opposition to conceptions of consultants as rhetorical wiz-
ards who engineer waves of management fashion, ﬁrms and consul-
tants are treated as boundedly rational actors who chase the secrets of
success by mimicking their highest-performing peers. Computational
experiments demonstrate that consultant-driven versions of this dy-
namic inwhich the outcomes of ﬁrms are strongly conditioned by their
choice of consultant are robustly faddish. The invasion of boom mar-
kets by low-quality consultants undercuts popular innovations while
simultaneously restarting the fashion cycle by prompting the ﬂight
of high-quality consultants into less densely occupied niches. Com-
putational experiments also indicate conditions involving consultant
mobility, aspiration levels, mimic probabilities, and client-provider
matching that attenuate faddishness.The contemporary organizational world is marked by the wavelike rise and
fall of management techniques. As Lynne Zucker commented presciently inious versions of this research were presented at the annual meetings of the Acad-
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Coevolution in Management Fashionthe late 1980s, “Few innovations are widely adopted, by organizations or
elsewhere, with most looking more like the sociological characterization
of ‘fads’ than social change” ð1988, p. 26Þ. Recent scholarship has devoted
much attention to modeling these faddish cycles of adoption and abandon-
ment. Theoretical models of the processes that can generate wavelike dif-
fusion include herding ðBanerjee 1992Þ, bandwagoning under uncertainty
ðAbrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993Þ, and adaptive emulation ðStrang and
Macy 2001Þ. Empirical studies of management fads range from network
models of adoption ðWestphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997Þ to analysis of the
ebb and ﬂow of managerial discourse ðAbrahamson and Eisenman 2008Þ.
Supply-side actors—whomwe call “consultants” as shorthand though they
may include gurus, academics, and advisers of various kinds insofar as they
work with demand-side adopters—play a crucial role in constructing, pro-
moting, and implementingmanagement techniques. No history of quality cir-
cles, for example, would be complete without Wayne Rieker, Don Dewar,
and Jeff Beardsley, who observed Japanese quality control circles in situ,
developed the ﬁrst American-style circle program at Lockheed Aerospace,
founded the International Association of Quality Circles, and then took their
acts on the road as independent consultants. No account of best-practice
benchmarking would be complete without Robert C. Camp, the logistics ex-
pert at Xerox who conducted the company’s ﬁrst external study visit and
played the lead role in disseminating benchmarking within Xerox and later
as author and founder of a consulting ﬁrm.
While empirical research is beginning to bring the activities of the world’s
“idea merchants” into focus ðe.g., Clark 1995; Jackson 2001; Kieser 2002; Heu-
sinkveld and Benders 2005; Perkmann and Spicer 2008Þ, the role of actors
who construct and implement novel techniques—the suppliers of manage-
ment fashion—remains undertheorized. Formal models of innovation adop-
tion and abandonment generally suppose that techniques sell themselves
and that ﬁrms talk only to each other. Demand for a better mousetrap is ex-
plicitly represented while supply is left implicit.
This article seeks to redress the imbalance by bringing the supply side
of organizational innovation into the equation. The model of adoption and
abandonment investigated here centers on the interaction between two pop-
ulations: consultants that develop and implement novel practices and ﬁrms
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Alemulation framework, we treat both ﬁrms and consultants as chasing the se-
crets of success by mimicking their highest-performing peers. The fates of the
two sets of actors are fundamentally intertwined, however, since ﬁrms rely
on consultants to realize the beneﬁts of novel techniques while consultants
rely on ﬁrms for their bread and butter. Computational experiments assess
the implications of coevolutionary adaptive emulation for the two interde-
pendent populations.
From a substantive perspective, we address prevailing conceptions of
the relationship between consultants and management fashion.2 As de-
tailed in the next section, much analysis suggests that consultants utilize
their interstitial position and superior rhetorical gifts to foist questionable
new techniques on anxiety-prone managers. While some elements of this
argument are persuasive, the notion that naïve managers are simply manip-
ulated by savvy consultants is problematic. We start instead from the as-
sumption that both consultants and managers are cognitively constrained
actors who operate in a highly competitive, causally ambiguous world. No-
tions of consulting wizardry, managerial gullibility, and worthless innova-
tions prove unnecessary for the emergence of faddish cycles and, in the case
of the latter, make such cycles less rather than more likely.REVIEW OF PREVAILING ARGUMENTS: THE CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON MANAGEMENT FASHION
Management consultants occupy a central role in the contemporary world
of organizations. Major initiatives in business, governmental, and nonproﬁt
sectors alike are made with their assistance ðDavid 2012Þ. Wood’s ð2002Þ ex-
tensive survey found that 70% of ﬁrms used consultants when embarking
on organizational change projects. These results are echoed by Buono ð2001,
p. viiÞ, who notes that consultants have become “increasingly visible in most,
if not all, organizational initiatives.” As Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall ð2002,
p. 18Þ observe, consultants have “come to orchestrate the ﬁeld of manage-
ment” by packaging ideas “in a way that makes disseminating them to the
larger publics possible.”
The prominence of the consulting industry is of recent vintage. Business
Week estimated that there was one consultant for every 100 managers in2A note on language: Abrahamson ð1996Þ deﬁnes “managerial fashion” as “rapid, bell-
shaped swings in the popularity of management techniques . . . the product of a
management-fashion setting process involving particular management fashion setters—
organizations and individuals who dedicate themselves to producing and disseminating
management knowledge” ðp. 256Þ. Our usage is related but distinct: we approach man-
agement fashion ðor, synonymously, fads, faddish cyclesÞ as rapid, bell-like swings that
may be generated by a variety of processes. Computational experiments below treat con-
sultant behavior as a variable whose impact on patterns of adoption/abandonment is of
interest.
228
This content downloaded from 130.102.042.098 on July 09, 2017 19:07:16 PM
l use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Coevolution in Management Fashion1965; by 1995, the ratio had reached one in 13 ðMcKenna 2006, p. 8Þ. Ruef
ð2002Þ noted that the percentage of master of business administration grad-
uates who join consultancies rose from a trickle in the 1950s to 20%–40% for
elite business schools in the 1990s. The share of global gross domestic prod-
uct ascribed to management consulting increased from less than 0.01% in
1970 to 0.15% in 1997 ðMay 1997 issue of Consultants NewsÞ. U.S. Census
Bureau data suggest linear expansion in consultancies over the last three
decades ðsee ﬁg. 1Þ.
The growth of the consulting industry has been accompanied by prom-
inent swings in management fashion, where named innovations gain wide-
spread but temporary popularity. Carson et al. ð2000Þ found a fourfold in-
crease from the 1950s to the 1990s in the speed at which discussions of an
innovation rise to a peak as well as a negative correlation between the length
of the cycle and the year when it began. Paradigmatic management fashions
such as quality circles, total quality management ðTQMÞ, and business pro-
cess reengineering hail from the 1980s and later, while earlier decades were
marked by slower, more segmental shifts in organizational techniques. The
shift in collective dynamics has reshaped academic theorizing, which focused
on institutionalization and homogeneity in the 1970s and early 1980s ðMeyer
and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983Þ but by the 1990s emphasized
the fragility of managerial rhetorics and practices ðBarley and Kunda 1992;
Abrahamson 1996Þ.
The literature suggests a variety of mechanisms that link fashion cycles
to the expansion of the consulting industry. Thematic connections are soFIG. 1.—Growth in the management consulting industry ðdata from County Business
Patterns, U.S. CensusÞ. A discontinuity between 1997 and 1998 results from a change in
census codes. Values prior to 1998 ðStandard Industrial Classiﬁcation ½SIC coding sys-
temÞ are not perfectly comparable to those from 1998 onward ðNorth American Industry
Classiﬁcation System ½NAICS codingÞ because of a widening of the management consult-
ing category.
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Alstrong, in fact, that Abrahamson’s ð1996Þ seminal analysis deﬁnes man-
agement fashion as a supply-side-driven process. Without seeking to be ex-
haustive, we review a variety of these arguments to discern their general
character. A top-level division separates the two subprocsses that combine
to generate faddish cycles: inﬂationary effects that promote the widespread
adoption of management techniques and deﬂationary effects that lead pop-
ular practices to lose their hold on the business community.
In terms of inﬂationary effects, ﬁrst, consultants help to unleash cycles
of management fashion by authoring some of the practices that gain pop-
ularity, thereby increasing the density and competitiveness of the market
for organizational innovation. An early example is the Project Evaluation
and Review Technique developed by Booz, Allen & Hamilton in the 1950s
and disseminated to its defense industry clients. Portfolio Planning and the
Growth-Share Matrix were the brainchildren of Bruce Henderson, who
left A. D. Little to found the Boston Consulting Group in 1963. The Bal-
anced Scorecard, a widely used management tool in the late 1990s and
2000s, was developed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton of Nolan, Nor-
ton & Company.
Second, consultants ðreÞpackage practices invented elsewhere to facili-
tate their widespread dissemination. Suddaby and Greenwood ð2001Þ see
the key activity of consultants as that of commodifying managerial knowl-
edge: turning local, contextual responses to speciﬁc problems into gener-
alized recipes that can be communicated and implemented across settings.
Rovik ð2002Þ ﬁnds that managerial innovations diffuse when made into a
user-friendly product that is readily installed in organizations. Benders and
van Veen ð2001Þ and Heusinkveld ð2014Þ argue that consultants devise in-
novations that possess interpretative viability: sufﬁcient ambiguity and
range of meaning that multiple audiences can be attracted to them for dif-
ferent reasons.
Third, consultants focus attention on practices whose “time has come.”
Their interstitial position gives supply-side actors access to the concerns of
a diverse array of managers and professionals, providing insight into the
approaches that are likely to be well received. Abrahamson ð1996, p. 264Þ
argues that “fashion setters sense incipient preferences guiding fashion de-
mand” and “select those techniques that they believe will satiate this de-
mand.” In this way, consultants ease “underlying anxieties” of managers
and provide a “comforting sense of order and identity and/or control” ðSturdy
2004, p. 157Þ. In the 1980s, for example, consultants promoted Japaneseman-
agement practices that spoke to widespread concerns over American indus-
trial decline.
Finally, consultants increase the market for management innovation
through their powers of persuasion. Clark ð1995Þ developed a dramatur-
gical perspective on consultant-client interaction that focuses on the rhe-230
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Coevolution in Management Fashiontorical generation of perceived threat while Kieser ð2002, p. 174Þ notes that
“in their presentation of management concepts, consultants not only pro-
voke fear, they raise hopes.” Abrahamson ð1996Þ argues that business dis-
course is framed by norms of rationality and progress that allow supply-
side actors to present novel management techniques as akin to scientiﬁc
breakthroughs.
If consultants popularize management innovations, how do they contrib-
ute to their downfall as well? First, the cultural labor that fosters fashion
booms also facilitates fashion busts. By stressing general mechanisms and
universal applicability, consultants sacriﬁce key contextual elements and
encourage usage in inappropriate settings. Jackson ð2001, p. 16Þ argues
that popular innovations often generate a backlash because supply-siders
oversimplify complex realities, resulting in a “gap between promise and
practice.” Techniques designed to appeal to multiple audiences may en-
gender confusion and conﬂict when put into practice ðBenders and van
Veen 2001Þ. Strang ð2010Þ ﬁnds that consulting interventions at a global
bank that minimized the cost of adoption via standardized scripts, staff
rather than line responsibility, and social movement–like tactics were read-
ily abandoned when leadership changed hands.
A second mechanism is rooted in supply-side demographics. When an
organizational practice’s popularity booms, a feeding frenzy emerges among
managers eager to jump on the bandwagon. Irrational exuberance on the
demand side precipitates an inﬂow of consultants into the area, including
many that lack relevant skills. While many supply-side actors thereby grab
a share of the market opportunity, ﬁrms are likely to experience implemen-
tation problems. David and Strang ð2006Þ demonstrate this effect for TQM,
which at the height of its popularity was a magnet for generalist consultants
with little expertise in manufacturing or quality control.
Finally, consulting rhetoric and dramaturgy emphasizing novelty, norms
of progress, and intensifying competition imply that the perceived value of
innovations dissipates with increased usage. One might expect that popular-
ity would promote institutionalization by conﬁrming the utility of an innova-
tion and reducing its cost. But if the adoption of innovations is interpreted
as a means of displaying cutting-edge leadership, popularity prompts ﬁrst-
movers to look for new ways to distinguish themselves. Managers come to
believe that they need consultants to stay ahead of the pack, resulting in
an addiction in which “consultants have made ½managers marionettes on
the strings of their fashions” ðKieser 2002, p. 176Þ.
Kieser alludes here to a central implication of the argument we have
sketched: consultants beneﬁt from the instability of management fashion.
Booms raise the perceived stakes for fashion consumers and thus the price
of innovation, while busts restart the market. A world riven by faddish cy-
cles of adoption and abandonment by ﬁrms is a world where consultants231
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Alcharge a steep price for their services. The institutionalization of a dominant
design, by contrast, would reduce returns to supply-side providers, since the
need for consulting assistance diminishes as managers gain familiarity with
a once-novel technique. The beneﬁts of faddishness to supply-side actors
are so apparent that some warn darkly of the consultant’s quasi-magical
powers.Williams ð2004, p. 769Þ, among others, denounces management con-
sultants “as ‘evil Svengalis’ who bring forth contagious concepts that serve
nobody except themselves.”
The ﬂip side of consulting wizardry is the notion that managers are in-
competent stewards of their ﬁrm’s interests. If consultants are hypnotists,
managers are presumably their dupes. Scholars ascribe managerial sug-
gestibility to status anxiety, fragmented work routines, and a cultivated in-
terest in symbolic performance ðHuczynski 1993; Kieser 1997, 2002; Clark
and Salaman 1998Þ. While commentators vary in the degree of foolishness
they assign to the demand side, most view consultants as active sense givers
and managers as their more passive audience ðthough see Sturdy ½2011Þ.
This is visible in accounts of the fashion upside, when consultants sell man-
agers innovations they did not know they wanted, and on the downside,
when postboom managers clamor for more.
Consulting wizardry and managerial incompetence are often joined to a
third key idea: the notion that popular management techniques have zero or
near-zero utility. Popular innovations are often described as “old wine in
new bottles,” dressing up timeless verities in provocative new language, or
as mere common sense ðJackson 2001Þ. Close analysis of consulting rhetoric
emphasizes limitations on the practical value of consulting services ðKieser
1997; Benders and van Veen 2001; Suddaby and Greenwood 2001Þ.
The triple pillars of consulting wizardry, managerial gullibility, and
worthless innovations combine to form a cogent “critical perspective” ðClark
and Fincham 2002Þ. When a popular management technique falls out of
favor, the dominant interpretation is that it must have lacked value in the
ﬁrst place. The spread of ineffective techniques is in turn traced to the self-
interested agency of the most obvious beneﬁciary, the consultant. And if
consultants are able to realize their interests without providing useful ser-
vices, how can their clients be anything other than feckless?
While the critical perspective is provocative and in many ways com-
pelling, it is also theoretically problematic. The weakest link is managerial
gullibility. It is unclear a priori whymanagers would be easily and repeatedly
fooled. As powerful, well-rewarded actors, managers ða term we use generi-
cally for organizational decision makersÞ are the winners in an elaborate
selection process. The skill set of those who run organizations differs from
that of those who proffer advice, generating the potential for mutually ben-
eﬁcial gains from trade, but it would be odd for the cognitive balance to be
so lopsided.232
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Coevolution in Management FashionThe critical perspective also runs afoul of the collective action problem.
While the consulting industry as a whole might beneﬁt if popular manage-
ment techniques proved to be short-lived, individual consultants linked to a
declining technique typically lose market share in the fashion bust. As a
result, carriers of a popular practice are not motivated to build in obso-
lescence, which might beneﬁt their peers but harm their own life chances.
They seek instead to make their services effective and long lasting, which
should help them retain clients and expand their market share.
One could rescue the critical perspective by viewing managers as the con-
sultant’s coconspirators. Perhaps managers perceive the limitations of pop-
ular innovations readily enough but have nothing to gain by pointing out
that the emperor has no clothes. This is one reading of Staw and Epstein
ð2000Þ, who found that corporate adoption of TQM was associated with
increased corporate reputation and chief executive ofﬁcer compensation but
not better organizational performance. The difﬁculty with this interpreta-
tion is that it simply shifts the location of the problem. If the manager is a
con artist allied with the consultant, someone else must take his or her place
as the resource-rich mark. Since corporate reputations reﬂect the assess-
ments of industry insiders and CEO pay is set by boards of directors, appeals
to demand-side knavery imply that the managers who adopt these practices
are duping their peers. It is not plausible that those who run large organiza-
tions would be individually cynical but collectively credulous.
The model of innovation adoption and abandonment developed here
thus starts not from the critical perspective but from the notions of bounded
rationality and social mimicry ðCyert and March 1963; DiMaggio and Powell
1983Þ. Consultants and managers/ﬁrms are treated as self-interested agents
who lack true knowledge of causal relationships. All actors draw on observed
outcomes to mimic behaviors associated with success, acting reasonably though
not necessarily insightfully. Collective outcomes arise from the mutual re-
sponsiveness of members of each group to their own outcomes, the outcomes
experienced by peers, and the choices of their exchange partners.
Investigation of this model can be understood as a “what if” experiment.
Do consultants amplify fashion cycles in worlds where they are nomore far-
seeing or persuasive than managers? As an exercise in computational sim-
ulation, this article does not seek to measure the empirical capabilities of
consultants and managers. Instead, we examine the dynamics produced by
boundedly rational vicarious learning on both the demand side and the sup-
ply side.COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
Computational simulation investigates postulated causal processes via the
analysis of “virtual experiments” ðCarley 2001Þ. This involves the transla-233
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Altion of a formal model into a computer program that is run repeatedly under
varying conditions ðe.g., alternative assumptions, different parameter valuesÞ
to identify resulting outcomes ðDavis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2007, p. 481Þ.
Computational simulation offers a “third way” of doing science ðalong with
theoretical deduction and empirical researchÞ, one particularly suited to
cases in which simple mechanisms interact in complex ways ðAxelrod 1997;
Harrison et al. 2007Þ.
The basic structure of two-population adaptive emulation formulated here
ðand implemented as a stand-alone Java programÞ is as follows. In each round,
ð1Þ consultants have a current innovation they supply; ð2Þ ﬁrms have a cur-
rent innovation they demand; ð3Þ ﬁrms and consultants are matched; ð4Þ each
consultant receives a return based on demand for its services; ð5Þ each ﬁrm
receives an outcome based on its performance; ð6Þ consultants decide ðin light
of their returnsÞ whether to continue to offer their current innovation versus
abandon it for an alternative and, if so, which one; and ð7Þ ﬁrms decide ðin
light of their outcomesÞ whether to continue to utilize their current innova-
tion versus abandon it for an alternative and, if so, which one. Neither ﬁrms
nor consultants know the stochastic rules that govern the system they operate
within. Instead, they follow the apparent lessons of the past. All actors are
adaptive in the sense that they tend to maintain their current behavior ði.e.,
their choice of innovationÞ when they experience good results and change
that behavior when they experience poor results. They are emulative in
that new strategies are directed toward the replication of successes else-
where. Firms imitate the highest-performing ﬁrm; consultants imitate the
most-sought-after consultant.Firms
The performance outcome of a ﬁrm i in period t is driven by the merit of
the ﬁrm’s chosen innovation ðVjÞ, the quality of the consultant implement-
ing the innovation ðQcÞ, and random noise:
Oit 5 aVj 1 bQc 1 ð12 a2 bÞεit:
The parameters ða, bÞ lie on the unit interval, with 0 ≤ a1 b ≤ 1. Variation
over their range allows us to investigate how innovation trajectories are in-
ﬂuenced by heterogeneity across innovations and consultants. If a5 0, the
identity of the chosen innovation has no impact on the ﬁrm’s outcomes;
if a5 1, the ﬁrm’s outcomes are determined completely by the innovation it
selects. If b5 0, the contracted-with consultant does not affect the ﬁrm’s
outcomes; if b5 1, the ﬁrm’s outcomes are determined completely by the
identity of its consultant. We thus refer to a as the parameter for innova-234
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Coevolution in Management Fashiontion merit and b as the parameter for consultant quality. The term εit sum-
marizes all sources of ﬁrm performance ðmarket conditions, various sources
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantage, etc.Þ other than those due to the ﬁrm’s choice of
innovation and consultant.3
A ﬁrm’s decision to abandon its current innovation rests on a compar-
ison of its realized outcomes with its aspiration level. Aspirations play a
central role in behavioral theories of decision making by providing the ac-
tor with a subjective reference point that distinguishes success from failure
ðMarch and Simon 1958Þ. Firmswith elevated aspirations code awide range
of outcomes as failures and are thus relatively likely to change their innova-
tion even if they have done well; ﬁrms with modest aspirations view a wide
range of outcomes as successful and are thus more likely to maintain their
current practice even if they have done poorly.
To model aspirations we employ Greve’s ð1998Þ framework for the anal-
ysis of adaptive change ðsee Bendor et al. ½2011 for extensive analysis of this
class of modelsÞ. The ﬁrm’s perception of the dividing line between success
and failure has two components: inward-looking attention to its own prior
achievements ðwhich deﬁnes the ﬁrm’s “historical aspiration,” or AHÞ and
outward-looking attention to the contemporaneous achievements of peers
ðwhich deﬁnes its “social aspiration,” or ASÞ. Firms thus consider whether
their performance today is better or worse than their prior performance
and whether their performance today is better or worse than the contem-
poraneous outcomes of peers:
Aði; tÞ5 gf AHði; tÞ1 ð12 gf ÞASði; tÞ;
where
AHði; tÞ5 ð12 z f ÞAHði; t2 1Þ1 z fOit21;
and
ASði; tÞ5 1=ðn2 1Þo
s≠i
Ost:
Thus gf describes the balance between inward- versus outward-looking
sources of the ﬁrm’s aspiration. If gf 5 1, outcomes are gauged solely in3Values of Vj and Qc are drawn prior to each simulation from truncated normal distribu-
tions with mean5 0.5 and SD5 0.28 ði.e., we draw from a normal distribution with mean
5 0.5 and SD 5 1 but accept only values that lie within the unit intervalÞ while values of
εit are drawn from a truncated normal distribution for each ﬁrm in each round. As a
robustness check, we alternatively drew values from uniform distributions, with no
change in the qualitative pattern of results reported below.
235
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Alterms of improvement over the past; if gf 5 0, they are based on com-
parisons to the average peer. The term z f captures the speed with which
historical aspirations are updated. If the updating rate is one, a ﬁrm’s his-
torical aspiration equals its performance in the immediately prior round
ðOit21Þ; for values less than one, historical aspirations are a weighted av-
erage of past performance over all rounds, with weights declining geomet-
rically with temporal distance.
The probability of abandonment ðagain, following Greve ½1998Þ is
modeled as a logistic function of the difference between the ﬁrm’s outcome
and its aspiration:
Pr ðDitÞ5 1=ð11 expfaf 1 bf ½Oit 2 Aði; tÞgÞ:
Responsiveness to the gap between performance and aspiration is deter-
mined by bf, while af gives the ﬁrm’s abandonment probability when per-
formance equals aspirations. Large positive values of bf imply a rapid rise in
the probability of abandonment ðtoward oneÞ when outcomes lag aspira-
tions and a correspondingly rapid drop ðtoward zeroÞ when outcomes ex-
ceed aspirations. At the other extreme, bf 5 0 implies that the ﬁrm is in-
different to its performance; all outcomes lead to the same abandonment
probability ðwe do not allow bf < 0, which would imply that ﬁrms become
more likely to abandon innovations when performance exceeds aspirationsÞ.
Larger positive values of af correspond to lower probabilities of abandon-
ment and thus inertia while smaller ðincluding negativeÞ values of af imply
greater volatility.
If a ﬁrm abandons its current innovation, it mimics apparent best prac-
tice with probability p_mimicf or adopts a new innovation drawn randomly
from the pool of innovations currently offered by consultants with probabil-
ity 1 2 p_mimicf.
4 Mimetic adopters deﬁne best practice as the innovation
associated with the highest performance outcome in the just-completed
round—equivalently, the innovation employed by the most successful of
the ﬁrm’s rivals and provided by the most effective ðas far as ﬁrms are
concernedÞ consultant. Prior research provides empirical support for this
decision rule. Burns ð1992Þ showed that the business press broadcasts suc-
cess stories to the virtual exclusion of tales of failure. Strang ð2010Þ found
that managers tasked to develop innovative strategies focused on speciﬁc
outcomes experienced by peers rather than aggregate comparisons and were
more attentive to successes than to failures.4Firms cannot immediately readopt an abandoned innovation; the pool of innovations
that ﬁrms select from randomly does not include the ﬁrm’s current innovation, and ﬁrms
abandoning current best practice are obliged to draw randomly from the pool. They can
return to a previously used practice at a later date, in keeping with documented serial adop-
tion in the corporate world ðCole 1999Þ.
236
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Consultants follow a parallel logic. Like ﬁrms, they receive a performance
outcome in every period ðtermed a “return” to distinguish it from the ﬁrm’s
“outcome”Þ, abandon innovations via comparison of this return to histori-
cally and socially deﬁned aspirations, and emulate observed success stories.
Decision parameters are set separately from those of ﬁrms, allowing us to
explore worlds where consultants are volatile and ﬁrms inert, where ﬁrms
herd but consultants experiment, and so forth.
Consulting returns are shaped by the demand for their services. This re-
solves into two distinct, albeit linked, quantities: the number of ﬁrms that
contract with the given consultant in the period and the balance of supply
and demand surrounding the consultant’s offered innovationwithin the sys-
tem as a whole. The former term captures the number of revenue sources
available to a service provider, while the latter term reﬂects the terms of
trade: if many ﬁrms desire the innovation and there are few alternative sup-
pliers, the consultant should obtain a higher fee. Take Fjt as the number of
ﬁrms pursuing innovation j, Sjt the number of consultants offering innova-
tion j, andMct the number of clients served by consultant c. The consultant’s
return in round t is then
Rct 5 hMctðFjt=SjtÞ;
where h is a constant that tunes the level of consulting returns. Consultant
returns range from zero ðif the consultant has no clientsÞ to a possible
maximum of h multiplied by the number of ﬁrms squared ðif one consul-
tant monopolizes the sole innovation that all ﬁrms demandÞ. Consultants
offering the same innovation are thus postulated to be in an equally strong
market position, but they each receive a different total return depending on
how many clients they acquire. For example, if an innovation is offered by
two consultants and demanded by 10 ﬁrms, one consultant might serve
seven ðgaining a return of h  7  10=2Þ and the other three ðgaining a return
of h  3  10=2Þ.
When a ﬁrm adopts a new innovation, it selects among the consultants
offering that technique on an outcome-proportional basis. LetOjðkÞ equal
the average outcome realized by the previous clients of consultant k im-
plementing innovation j over some temporal window ðgenerally set to three
periodsÞ. Then the probability that a ﬁrm will select consultant k ðfrom the
pool of consultants offering the desired innovationÞ is
PrðHj 5 kÞ5 ½OjðkÞ1 c=
n
os
h
OjðsÞ1 c
io
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Alwhere the numerator represents k’s track record and the denominator rep-
resents the track record of all consultants currently offering innovation j.5
The constant term c ensures that all consultants in the pool—including new
entrants and others that have not yet obtained any clients—have a non-
zero probability of being selected. ðWe set c to 0.025 in the experiments
below; robustness tests showed little sensitivity to values of c and the size
of the temporal window.Þ Client-provider matches are maintained until ei-
ther the ﬁrm or the consultant decides to make a change. If the ﬁrm aban-
dons the innovation, the consultant loses a client. If the consultant leaves
the market, its prior clients reselect from the remaining providers on the
same outcome-proportional basis that newcomers use. Firms are obliged to
select a new innovation if no consultants remain in the market.6
The structure of adoption/abandonment decisions made by consultants
mirrors that of ﬁrms. Current innovations are abandoned because of failure
to obtain a satisfactory return relative to a weighted combination of the con-
sultant’s own past track record and the contemporary achievements of oth-
ers. Consultants that elect to offer a new innovation emulate their most suc-
cessful peer ðconsultant, not ﬁrmÞ with probability p_mimicc or adopt a new
innovation drawn randomly from the pool of possible innovations with
probability 12 p_mimicc. Unlike ﬁrms, however, consultants who “experi-
ment” ðdraw randomly from the poolÞ select from the full range of possi-
ble innovations, regardless of whether these are currently utilized by ﬁrms
or not.COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
Illustrative Dynamics of a Coevolving System
We begin by inspecting one realization of the two-population version of adap-
tive emulation deﬁned above. This provides an opportunity to see the formal-5The ﬁrm’s selection of a consultant is based on favorable prior outcomes rather than
price competition; all consultants charge “what the market will bear” given supply and
demand. This reﬂects our understanding that ﬁrms focus on the potential for upside gains
rather than treating innovation as a commodity in which marginal cost plays a key role.
On the supply side, Fuller ð1999, p. 74Þ notes that “consultants will rarely discuss fees in
initial meetings with clients . . . consultants are not hagglers.”
6We should stress the key assumption that ﬁrms ﬁrst select the ðhighest-scoringÞ inno-
vation and then contract with a consultant offering that innovation. A different deci-
sion rule would be for mimetic adopters to select the ðhighest-scoringÞ consultant, which
would implement that innovation ðor conceivably direct the ﬁrm to another practiceÞ. This
alternative approach is inconsistent with the observed success stories that lie at the heart
of our model. While some consultants do indeed gain elite status, business discourse cen-
ters on named innovations rather than named providers ðAbrahamson 1996; Strang and
Macy 2001Þ, and case histories of adoption indicate that ﬁrms choose a strategic innovation
and then locate a consultant rather than the reverse ðO’Shea and Madigan 1997, chap. 6;
Strang 2010, chap. 8Þ.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionism in action, gain a sense of the characteristic trajectories it induces, and build
intuition about the interplay between innovation supply and demand. Much
experience with these models tells us that the results displayed here are char-
acteristic given the parameter settings.
We simulate 100 ﬁrms and 100 consultants who select from a menu of
100 possible innovations over a 300-period history. Parameters are set to
values that combine the multiple drivers of behavior, which are isolated
in the next section to test their impact. The outcomes experienced by ﬁrms
are determined by an equal measure of innovation merit, consultant qual-
ity, and luck ða5 :33, b5 :33Þ. Historical and social aspirations also have
equal weight ðgf 5 gc 5 0:5Þ, with past performance expeditiously updated
ðz f 5 z c 5 0:8Þ. Firms and consultants are responsive to the gap between
outcomes and aspirations ðbf 5 bc 5 10Þ and are moderately volatile, with
about 12% ready to abandon their current innovation when results equal
aspirations ðaf 5 ac 5 2, h5 1; 000Þ. Given the decision to make a change,
members of both populations emulate their most successful peers with
p_mimicf 5 p_mimicc 5 0.8.
Figure 2 portrays a single trial based on these parameter settings, with
the x-axis indicating the period ðfrom one to 300Þ. We track the rise and fall
of “leading innovations”—the most popular innovation in each round—as a
measure of dynamic central tendency. Usage of the most popular innova-
tion among ﬁrms is charted in the top panel, and usage of the leading in-
novation among consultants ðwhich is not necessarily the leading innova-
tion of ﬁrmsÞ is charted in the bottom panel. Vertical lines within the graphs
indicate changes in the identity of these popular practices; the index of each
new leading innovation is shown next to each vertical line, with an arrow
pointing to the round when that innovation becomes more popular than
any other.7
Looking ﬁrst at the collective dynamics of ﬁrms, we see rapid conver-
gence toward speciﬁc practices. A ﬁrst distinctly popular innovation ð#54Þ
is adopted by about 50% of ﬁrms, though its fame lasts only some 15 pe-
riods. Two rather long-lasting popular practices emerge later in this sim-
ulated history, one of which ðinnovation #53Þ holds the interest of between
40% and 75% of ﬁrms for an extended period, and a second even more
durable innovation ð#18Þ that at its peak is demanded by almost 80% of all
ﬁrms. Intervening and subsequent interregnums involve a medley of more7This is akin to showing the proﬁle of an iceberg above the waterline. Leading innova-
tions begin to build up adherents before they appear in the graph ðbut since some other
innovation has more, we do not see themÞ and likewise retain some adherents after they
fall out of view. Mini cascades also occur, where innovations experience upswings and
downswings without ever becoming the most widely adopted innovation at any given
time.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionabrupt boom-bust cycles, with a number of leading innovations that retain
prominence for 10 or fewer time points.
Consultants show a similar dynamical pattern, converging on a speciﬁc
practice and then moving away as rival innovations emerge and win suc-
cess. Indeed, their collective trajectory over the course of the run is strik-
ingly parallel to that of ﬁrms. Both populations move toward the same dom-
inant practices for most of the two long-lasting cycles. Although neither
ﬁrms nor consultants respond directly to each other’s choices, the two series
are synchronized by the fact that consulting performance depends on client
demand. Consultants move toward the most underserved innovation in the
system—the innovation that has most recently provided supernormal re-
turns for a lucky provider. This is not necessarily the innovation for which
aggregate demand is highest since the most popular practice among ﬁrms
may be overserved while rising markets are neglected. Net of random ﬂuc-
tuation and path dependency within individual histories, however, the end
result is congruence in the distribution of ﬁrms and consultants across in-
novations.
The system’s adoption-abandonment dynamics are asymmetric, with con-
sultants more responsive to the distribution of innovation choices among
ﬁrms than vice versa. Firms are inﬂuenced by the collective locational choices
of consultants, which deﬁne the pool of adoptable practices, some of which
are made especially attractive by their association with high-quality con-
sultants. But these are indirect mechanisms with subtle effects relative to
the consulting imperative to invade client-rich markets.While not easily de-
tected in the graph ðbecause consultants are quick on their feetÞ, the ten-
dency is for large-scale swings on the supply side to follow demand-side
movements.
The example history alerts us to two characteristic differences in the dy-
namics of demand- and supply-side movement. First, consultants have a
weaker tendency toward convergence than ﬁrms do: the percentage of con-
sultants pursuing a given leading innovation is almost always smaller than
the corresponding percentage of ﬁrms. Second, consultants are more tem-
porally variable in their adoption patterns. The lower panel is more spiky or
jagged in appearance than the upper panel.
Lesser convergence and greater temporal volatility reﬂect the implicit
beneﬁts to differentiation among consultants. If the number of providers
offering an innovation equals or exceeds the number of ﬁrms demanding the
innovation, none of the consultants is well positioned to garner strong re-
turns. A smaller group of consultants serving a proportionately large pool of
ﬁrms can and will often do better. Firms, by contrast, are not overtly pe-
nalized by crowding, although the social component of their aspirations
leads them to be dissatisﬁed in a market in which others do, on average, as
well as they do. In addition, while some ﬁrms will leave such markets be-241
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Alcause of their unsatisﬁed aspirations to do better than “the herd,” this out-
ﬂow is counterbalanced by entry of ﬁrms drawn into the market by success
stories.
Competitive differentiation on the supply side thus tends to keep the over-
all level of convergence among consultants proportional to but below that of
ﬁrms and means that the appeal of leading innovations is frequently undercut
by supply/demand imbalances in less well-subscribed domains. Precisely be-
cause consultants are so responsive to market openings, they constantly charge
off in search of “the next big thing,” pursuing signals that may never register
within the more placid population of ﬁrms.The Impact of Consultants on Faddish Dynamics
Having gained insight into the basic functioning of two-population adap-
tive emulation, we vary the impact of consultants on ﬁrms to understand
how they affect patterns of adoption and abandonment. Do consultants play
a stabilizing role, increasing the chances that ﬁrms will converge on com-
mon practices and maintain them over time? Or do they make collective tra-
jectories more faddish, stimulating ﬁrst booms and then busts? To ﬁnd out,
we contrast versions of coevolutionary adaptive emulation that are “con-
sultant driven” in the sense that consultants powerfully inﬂuence outcomes
with scenarios in which consultants are less consequential.
In prior work with single-population adaptive emulation, Strang and
Macy ð2001Þ and Strang and Still ð2004Þ showed that innovation merit, the
extent to which variation across innovations drives performance outcomes,
is a central factor in differentiating collective dynamics. Outcome patterns
can be usefully partitioned into three qualitative regimes—turbulence, fads,
and institutionalization—and two transitions, from turbulence to fads and
from fads to institutionalization.Witha ðthe parameter for innovation meritÞ
near zero, almost worthless innovations characteristically generate a turbu-
lent regime of incessant change. Because success stories occur at random,
no innovation can remain popular for long. As a rises toward some thresh-
old level, however, the froth of turbulence consolidates to form faddish
waves. Innovations with sufﬁcient merit are able to garner substantial pop-
ularity, but the relationship between merit and ﬁrm performance is not
strong enough for these innovations to retain a leading position indeﬁnitely.
Further increases in a generate lengthening waves of increasing amplitude,
until a second qualitative transition occurs. Above some value of a, we see
an institutionalized pattern in which a highly effective practice, once pop-
ular, has an extremely low probability of losing its hold on the simulated
population. Visible waves are replaced by stable dominance in which one
innovation—not necessarily the most meritorious but always near the top—
gains a virtually unchallengeable position.242
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Coevolution in Management FashionThe same sequence is replicated here, beginning with a world of pure
noise and ending with one driven solely by innovation merit. We then
contrast these results—and this is the critical novelty—with a parallel se-
quence of analyses that locate the nonrandom element in the choice of
consultant. In a world where 75% of outcomes are random noise, does it
matter whether the systematic signal is located in innovation merit ða5 :25,
b5 0Þ or consultant quality ða5 0, b5 :25Þ? Does a world where corpo-
rate outcomes are determined solely by differences among consultants ða5 0,
b5 1Þ differ from one where they are determined by differences among in-
novations ða5 1, b5 0Þ?
Model results are summarized in terms of simple statistics based on the
now-familiar notion of a leading innovation. Popularity gives the percent-
age of ﬁrms utilizing the leading innovation; this is just the average height
of graphs like the ones shown in ﬁgure 2. Turnover counts the total num-
ber of leading innovations that arise over the trial. A faddish pattern is
signaled by the combination of high popularity and high turnover, while
low popularity–high turnover indicates a turbulent world where ﬁrms
seldom converge, high popularity–low turnover an institutionalized world
where bandwagons gain a near-permanent hold on the population, and low
popularity–low turnover a sleepy world of great inertia.8
The two experimental series below show how collective trajectories vary
as random noise is leavened by increasingly strong effects of either inno-
vation merit or consultant quality. We report just the adoption/abandon-
ment choices of ﬁrms; the movements of consultants are not shown, though
they inﬂuence and are inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm behavior that we chart. Fig-
ure 3 gives the popularity of leading innovations, while ﬁgure 4 gives the
rate of turnover in leading innovations. With the exception of the factors
that we vary systematically ða and bÞ, parameters are set to the values given
in the model illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 3 shows that convergence on popular innovations tends to rise
with both innovation merit ðdashed lineÞ and consultant quality ðsolid
lineÞ. Average utilization of the most popular innovation is relatively low
at the extreme left of the graph, which represents a world of pure noise. In
the absence of both innovation merit and consultant quality, bandwag-
ons are typically limited since the success stories of the recent past are
seldom duplicated. As the impact of luck diminishes and the signal/noise
ratio increases ði.e., moving to the right of the graphÞ, bandwagons grow in
duration as well as scale. Efforts to replicate success become more long-8The parameter space explored in this section generates the ﬁrst three patterns ðfads,
turbulence, and institutionalizationÞ but not the fourth, which is produced if actors have
very low aspirations; so they seldom try new innovations, instead “making do” with
historically set idiosyncratic traditions. Inertial worlds are considered below in the sub-
section on parameter variation.
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FIG. 3.—Popularity of leading innovations among ﬁrms ðaverage values for trials
across levels of noiseÞ.
American Journal of Sociology
Allived when apparent best practice is underpinned by innovation merit or
consultant quality.
Figure 4 presents the other side of the coin—the rate at which popular
innovations rise and fall. The left side of the graph indicates that the
tenures of leading innovations are short-lived when outcomes are based
solely on random noise. In a typical simulation of this type, a population
of 100 ﬁrms ﬂocks to some 120 leading innovations over the course of
300 rounds, with each popular practice receiving a scant few moments of
fame before collapsing. As the signal/noise ratio increases, turbulence isFIG. 4.—Turnover in leading innovations among ﬁrms ðaverage values for trials
across levels of noiseÞ.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionreplaced by boom-bust swings whose periodicity lengthens. At the ex-
treme right of the graph, where outcomes are determined entirely by the
choice of innovation ðinnovation meritÞ or consultant ðconsultant qualityÞ,
“swings of fashion” occur so glacially that simulation histories reﬂect con-
vergence on and retention of a single dominant innovation.
A key result here deserves emphasis: a noisy world of “worthless in-
novations” is not characteristically a faddish world. While cycles of pop-
ularity are often taken as a priori evidence that innovations have zero
or near-zero value, the computational model simulated here implies that
faddishness arises where innovations have some—not too much, but not
too little—effectiveness. Worlds made up of worthless innovations are not
faddish because success stories cluster too little to allow bandwagons to
grow; worlds of highly effective innovations are not faddish because suc-
cess stories cluster too much to allow bandwagons to collapse. Within the
framework of adaptive emulation, rapid bell-like swings are the signature
trajectory of innovations or consultants that possess modest value, not zero
value.
Both innovation merit and consultant quality are thus stabilizing factors
when contrasted to random noise. As the weight given to either quantity
increases, bandwagons grow as turbulence morphs into faddish cycles and
lengthen as faddish cycles give way to stable convergence. Firms gravitate to
innovations that have superior merit in the ﬁrst series of experiments and to
innovations that are served by the best consultants in the second. The signal
provided by these relatively stable inﬂuences serves to extend the wild swings
in adoption and abandonment we see in purely random worlds.
As ﬁgures 3 and 4 make clear, however, the worlds generated by inno-
vation merit and consulting quality do not stabilize at the same rate or to
the same extent. Where noise is replaced by innovation merit, popularity
rises quickly and turnover declines even more dramatically. Where noise is
replaced by consultant quality, by contrast, the growth of popularity is
slow and the decline in turnover halting. The disparity between the two
curves is especially large for medium and high levels of noise, which rep-
resent the enormous variety of factors at play in ﬁrm performance. Rates
of turnover are more rapid in a world driven by 40% noise and 60% con-
sultant quality than one driven by 80% noise and just 20% innovation
merit. Differences in turnover lessen only when noise falls implausibly to-
ward zero.
Another way to summarize these results is with reference to the turbulent,
faddish, and institutionalized regimes described above. For simplicity, let
us demarcate these regimes in terms of turnover in leading innovations,
describing a world as turbulent if turnover occurs in more than 30% of
rounds, faddish if turnover is in the 15%–30% range, and institutional-245
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Alized if turnover occurs in less than 15% of rounds. By these cut points,
worlds based on innovation merit transition to faddishness early ðat around
a5 0:04Þwhile worlds based on consulting quality do so much later ðat about
b5 0:17Þ. Worlds driven by innovation merit become institutionalized at
around a5 0:15, just when ones driven by consulting quality are starting
to become faddish, while the latter become institutionalized only when con-
sulting quality makes up more than 50% of outcomes ðb5 0:52Þ. The fad-
dish region is thus substantially larger when corporate outcomes are shaped
by consulting quality rather than innovation merit.
To understand why consultant-driven innovation tends to generate fad-
dish trajectories, consider a stylized but characteristic boom and bust cycle.
It begins when a few ﬁrms happen upon an innovation discovered by one or
a few consultants. If these consultants are sufﬁciently high in quality ðrela-
tive to other consultants offering other innovationsÞ and the ﬁrms are rea-
sonably lucky, the innovation is well positioned to become the site of a string
of dramatic success stories. Other ﬁrms—particularly those suffering from
poor luck or the ministrations of ineffective consultants—imitate their top-
performing peers and ﬂock to the innovation. These migrating ﬁrms tend
to beneﬁt from the move since they are now working with the high-quality
consultants that were the source of performance gains for others. The in-
novation’s popularity among ﬁrms grows, and this increases the chance that
top performers will continue to be located among its followers.
As ﬁrms bandwagon, consultants that supply the now wildly popular
innovation earn supernormal returns. They garner many more clients than
rival consultants offering lower-proﬁle innovations do, and the favorable
balance of supply and demand means that they can charge more per
contract. They thus emerge as the top performers among consultants,
impressing their peers with the rewards that ﬂow from providing a red-hot
innovation. The resulting success stories spark supply-side bandwagoning
as relatively dissatisﬁed consultants enter the market in search of a piece of
the action.
As additional consultants ﬂow into the popular innovation, however, the
average quality of providers tends to diminish. This occurs in part because
many supply-side “fashion surfers” lack the capacity to provide excellent
service—one reason they failed to sustain client relationships elsewhere.
Reduction in average quality also occurs via exit, since the inﬂux of hun-
gry providers hastens the departure of consultants who see their previous
monopoly becoming a competitive market and their high-priced innova-
tion a commodity. The high-quality consultants who pioneered the rising
innovation are particularly likely to exit in the face of this competition since
their aspirations skyrocket during the period when ﬁrms jumped on the
bandwagon but fellow consultants had not yet begun to respond.246
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Coevolution in Management FashionAs lower-quality consultants enter and higher-quality consultants exit,
clients begin to feel the effects. The average ﬁrm experiences reduced out-
comes that increase its probability of abandoning the practice. And at the
collective level, even more devastatingly, success stories among ﬁrms come
to describe rival innovations staffed by small cadres of high-quality con-
sultants. Asﬁrms and then consultants exit in droves, the sequence begins all
over again.
The faddishness of consultant-driven innovation is thus rooted in qual-
ity differentials among mobile providers. Low- and average-quality con-
sultants ﬂood into lucrative markets and make them less appealing to the
high-quality consultants that created those markets in the ﬁrst place. A
corresponding dynamic is absent when value is located in innovations. Un-
like consultants, unsuccessful and ineffective innovations are not agents
motivated to invade the markets built by their peers. If consultants were
similarly immobile, a supply-side feeding frenzy would not follow a boom
market. And if consultants were all of the same quality, the feeding frenzy
that did occur would not reduce demand-side outcomes and induce market
collapse.9
The pattern of weaker consultants chasing their better-endowed peers
from fad to fad does not eliminate the favorable return on consultant qual-
ity. High-quality consultants gain a larger share of the market than low-
quality consultants do. Where 50% of the variation in outcomes is deter-
mined by noise and the rest by differences across providers, for example,
consultants whose quality is above the 90th percentile attract 26% of total
client contracts, with the highest-quality consultant serving 10 times as
many clients as the median consultant. Supply-side concentration is in-
versely related to the amount of noise in the system, since noisy outcomes
tend to reduce the impact of consultants and thus the choices that ﬁrms
make. As the signal provided by consulting quality rises to 100%while noise
falls to zero, the top 10% of consultants attract 46% of total client contracts
over 300 rounds, with the top consultant serving more than 32 times as
many clients as the median consultant.
High-quality consultants also move less frequently than low-quality
consultants. They are better positioned to retain clients even if the inno-
vations where they locate do not garner major success stories and retain a9Price competition would reinforce the faddishness of consultant-driven innovation.
Consider that consultants who experience the most demand ðcharacteristically high-
quality market pioneersÞ would charge a higher price for their services while market
entrants tend to offer low fees to undercut established providers. If ﬁrms were sensitive
to these price differentials, they would be more prone to hire newly entering consultants,
which would hasten the outﬂow of high-quality pioneers and amplify fashion cycles.
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Alhigher percentage of clients in rising markets as well. It takes time for the
entry-exit dynamics described above to play out, and during this time,
high-quality consultants are likely to be located within a growing market
while lower-quality providers ﬂit from opportunity to opportunity. With
noise set to 50%, the number of innovations provided by consultants ðor,
equivalently, the number of innovations they abandonÞ is correlated 2.36
with consultant quality.Demand- and Supply-Side Interactions in a Real-World
Management Fashion: Business Process Reengineering
It is informative to compare the model trajectories described above to an
empirical case. We review the market dynamics of business process reen-
gineering ðBPR, or “reengineering”Þ, the most fashionable managerial in-
novation of the 1990s.
By the late 1980s, the emergence of distributed computing and the wide-
spread availability of accessible software had made possible new methods
of information storage, retrieval, and sharing.While corporate leaders lacked
insight into this emerging technology, those at the interface between com-
puter science and management were well positioned to recognize the op-
portunities afforded by information technology ðITÞ. The most prominent
such ﬁgure was Michael Hammer, who lectured in Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology’s Computer Science Department and Sloan School of
Management. After management consultancy was added to his several hats
in 1987, Hammer’s 1990Harvard Business Review article ð“Reengineering
Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate”Þ introduced the concept of BPR to the
management community. Thomas Davenport and James Short, authors of
BPR’s other foundational piece ð“The New Industrial Engineering: Infor-
mation Technology and Business Process Redesign,” 1990Þ, were similarly
in the right place at the right time. Davenport was a partner at Ernst &
Young’s Center for Information Technology and Strategy who had con-
sulted at McKinsey and taught at the Harvard Business School,10 and Short
was a research associate at the Center for Information Systems Research at
the Sloan School and a lecturer at Boston University.
Success stories were key evidence for both Hammer ð1990Þ and Dav-
enport and Short ð1990Þ. Hammer’s article drew especially on Ford, whose
invoiceless processing system led to 75% downsizing in accounts payable.
Hammer also cited the experience of Mutual Beneﬁt & Life, whose case
management system cut application processing times from ﬁve to 25 days10Davenport received a sociology Ph.D. from Harvard, where as the ﬁrst author’s
sophomore tutor he graciously accepted a research paper on the sociological implica-
tions of punk rock.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionto two to ﬁve days. Davenport and Short reported on 19 ﬁrms including
IBM, Digital Equipment, Du Pont, and ðlike HammerÞ Ford and Mutual
Beneﬁt & Life while offering a detailed account of process redesign at
Rank Xerox U.K. This too was a success story, credited with a reduction of
delivery times from 33 to six days coupled with a cut in head count.
Supply-side advocacy ampliﬁed as BPR began to catch on. Business
press articles with “reengineering” in the title increased from four in 1990 to
17 in 1991, 34 in 1992, and 139 in 1993, and a review of this corpus reveals
overwhelmingly favorable accounts that aggressively touted BPR ðJung
2006Þ. In 1993, Hammer teamed with James Champy to pen Reengineer-
ing the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution, the best seller
that vaulted BPR to superstar status. The authors explained that their ap-
proach would upend Taylorist architectures based on functional speciali-
zation and contended that its immediate adoption was vital for corporate
survival. Hammer and Champy rehearsed the now-tired histories of Ford
and Mutual Beneﬁt & Life while also presenting new exemplars such as
Taco Bell and Bell Atlantic.
BPR became the hot business innovation of the 1990s, a testament to the
bold claims, success stories, and good historical timing that marked the
advocacy of Hammer, Davenport, and others. In 1993, when the ﬁrst cor-
porate survey of adoption was conducted, 57% of Fortune 1,000 ﬁrms with
a TQM program were pursuing BPR initiatives ðLawler, Mohrman, and
Ledford 1995Þ. The wave continued to crest; two years later, the same au-
thors reported that 81% of Fortune 1,000 companies were now utilizing
BPR, with an average employee involvement rate of 38% ðLawler, Mohr-
man, and Ledford 1998; see also Jackson 2001, p. 73Þ.
A small cadre of consultants reaped the rewards of reengineering ini-
tiatives during the fashion upswing. In 1990 and 1991, the ﬁeld was mo-
nopolized by IT specialists like CSC Index, a division of the database ap-
plications giant Computer Services Corporation headed by Champy, and
by elite consultancies like Ernst & Young that were linked to early devel-
opments at MIT and Harvard. Hammer & Company was more concerned
with executive education than program implementation, although its Phoe-
nix Program served a blue-chip consortium of 27 “leading-edge ﬁrms com-
mitted to the process revolution” ðJackson 2001, p. 76Þ. These sorts of elite
consultancies aside, few providers appear to have offered BPR services be-
fore 1992 ðJung 2006, pp. 107–8Þ. As a result, ﬁrst-movers reaped enormous
rewards. CSC Index entered the decade as a $30 million business; in 1995 it
was a $220 million business with 400 consultants worldwide ðYurko 1995Þ.
The larger consulting community, however, soon took notice of the
boom market. In 1994, Kinni reported that the “blizzard of interest” in
BPR among corporations was a boon to the consulting industry as “re-
engineering ‘experts’ rushed into the marketplace” ðp. 11Þ. Mintz ð1994,249
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Alp. 42Þ contended that windfalls were enjoyed by all consultants “who
½could plausibly claim expertise in the realm of ½BPR.” The consulting
pool exploded: Kennedy’s Directory of Management Consultants listed 456
consultancies that numbered BPR as one of their service offerings in 1995,
and by 1996 BPR was a $51 billion industry ðJarrar and Aspinwall 1999Þ.
While all market signals were positive, however, only 39% of reengineer-
ing providers possessed an IT background, and many were young ﬁrms lo-
cated in regions with few competitors ðJung 2006Þ.
Reengineering’s next chapter was one of decline on both the demand
and supply sides, though the falloff was so abrupt that we cannot identify
their relative timing. On the demand side, Bain’s survey of management
tools shows a reduction of nearly 50% in corporate usage from 1995 to
2000. Business discourse fell even more sharply: the number of BPR-titled
articles dropped by more than half from 1995 to 1996 ðJung 2006Þ. One
industry journal linked reengineering’s declining credibility to the feeding
frenzy: “½BPR made a lot of sense. But then came the book, the buzzword
fad, the hordes of consultants—and the trouble” ðMariotti 1996, p. 20Þ.
Elite consultants were quick to leap off the bandwagon. At the peak
of the fashion cycle, the Economist noted, “As re-engineering reaches ma-
turity, rival consultants are trying to come up with the next money-spinning
idea” ð1995, p. 63Þ. A managing partner at Andersen Consulting commented,
“Re-engineering has been a very valuable concept, but the easy pickings
are gone” ðWhite 1996, p. A1Þ. While middle-of-the-road consultants re-
mained willing to provide BPR services ðlistings in Kennedy’s Directory of
Management Consultants dropped just 13% from 1995 to 1999Þ, the gurus
and market leaders that had made BPR famous diversiﬁed into other in-
terventions. CSC Index shifted to an emphasis on “organizational agility”;
Booz, Allen & Hamilton developed “value engineering” focused on revenue
and growth rather than cost-cutting; Champy blended reengineering, strat-
egy, and culture change; and Hammer went “beyond reengineering” to ad-
dress “the human dimensions” of management.
One innovation does not test a model. And many key pieces of BPR’s
history are unavailable: we are unaware of systematic data on program
outcomes at the level of the individual ﬁrm and cannot determine from the
historical record whether demand-side exits preceded, followed, or were
simultaneous with the departure of elite consultants. We are struck, how-
ever, by the parallels between reengineering and the trajectories generated
by coevolutionary adaptive emulation. These include ð1Þ the jump-starting
of interest by a handful of elite consultancies, ð2Þ the key role of publicly
visible success stories, ð3Þ rapid growth in corporate demand, ð4Þ extraor-
dinary proﬁts earned by a small number of supply-side pioneers, ð5Þ the rush
of consultants of all types into the market, and ð6Þ substantial decline in250
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Coevolution in Management Fashioncorporate demand accompanied by attempts by pioneering consultants to
differentiate their product or exit the market.Variation in Faddishness: Model-Based Insights
We have focused thus far on the characteristic impact of consultants on
faddish cycles. But computational simulation can do more than indicate
main effects; it also permits exploration of variability. We explore the im-
pact of several parameters on rates of turnover in leading innovations with
an eye to specifying qualitative relationships of interest.
Since we are primarily concerned with the impact of consulting behavior
on faddishness, we examine a noisy world where consultant quality plays a
signiﬁcant role. We set Oit 5 :05Vj 1 :15Qc 1 :8εit while sequentially vary-
ing parameters of interest ðnonmanipulated terms take on the same values
as in the previous sectionÞ. A series of analyses across levels of noise were
also conducted; these are not reported because of space constraints but con-
ﬁrm the directional effects reported below.
Consultant volatility.—Since supply-side faddishness is rooted in the
mobility of consultants, the rate at which providers change innovations is a
potential brake on the system. If consultants are so inertial that even con-
sistent failure is unlikely to prompt a decision to try something different,
they become ﬁxed quantities akin to innovations. In the model, consulting
volatility can be tuned via the parameters that translate consulting returns
into abandonment probabilities. We focus here on ac, which sets the level
of consultant inertia: low values imply frequent movement of consultants
across innovations while high values indicate supply-side sluggishness. ðVar-
iation in bc affects sensitivity to good vs. bad outcomes but not intrinsic
restlessness.Þ
Figure 5 shows that rates of turnover in leading innovations decrease as
consultant inertia rises. In worlds where providers are highly volatile ðlarge
negative values of acÞ, boommarkets are rapidly invaded and even the most
successful consultants are prone to try something new.When consultants are
slow to move ðlarge positive values of acÞ, by contrast, markets stabilize and
leading innovations retain their popularity longer. Consultants that are both
inert and high quality are reluctant to abandon boom markets, which are
more slowly invaded by competitors in any case.
But this beneﬁt comes at a cost. Recall that consultants affect ﬁrms not
only by implementing desired innovations but by making those practices
available in the ﬁrst place. If consultants are slow to abandon their current
practices for new ones, the pool of innovations that ﬁrms sample from is
smaller. This is a version of the trade-off between exploration and exploi-
tation ðMarch 1991Þ, one whose terms are governed by the balance between251
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FIG. 5.—Consultant volatility and innovation turnover ðaverage values for trials
across levels of acÞ.
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Alinnovation merit and consultant quality. If novel practices differ greatly in
intrinsicmerit while consulting quality varies little ðhigha, low bÞ, it is more
critical for consultants to discover the diamonds in the rough. Consultants
in such a world play a more important role as “prospectors” in identifying
valuable innovations than as “developers” who turn the raw material into a
beneﬁcial service. If innovations differ little in intrinsic merit while con-
sultants differ substantially in quality ðlow a, high bÞ, on the other hand,
the exploratory activity of consultants yields limited dividends while con-
sulting volatility is costly because it promotes the outﬂow of high-quality
consultants from popular practices.
Historical versus social aspirations.—While parameter shifts that ren-
der consultants immobile are blunt instruments, a sharper tool is provided
by manipulating parameters that determine which consultants move. Re-
call that supply-side abandonment decisions result from a mix of inward-
looking versus outward-looking comparisons: the relevant parameter is gc,
which ranges from zero ðpurely social aspirationsÞ to one ðpurely historical
aspirationsÞ. If gc is high, consultants that have recently done well are likely
to abandon their current innovation when they confront a minor downturn
while those that operate in a stable, albeit meager, market share are likely
to stay put. If gc is low, on the other hand, consultants in small markets are
likely to try their fortunes elsewhere while those in strong but declining mar-
kets tend to persevere.
Figure 6 shows that faddishness is promoted where a consultant’s as-
pirations are dominated by its history ðgc closer to oneÞ and diminished
when social comparisons play a larger role ðgc closer to zeroÞ. Key to this
result is the behavior of pioneering supply-siders who are responsible for252
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FIG. 6.—Consultant aspirations and innovation turnover ðaverage values for trials
across levels of gcÞ.
Coevolution in Management Fashionthe growth of leading innovations. These consultants experience super-
normal returns in the ramp-up phase and weaker, albeit above-average,
returns once other consultants ﬂood the market. If their aspirations are
dominated by their own historical experience ðAm I doing better today
than yesterday?Þ, pioneers are quick to leave when other providers crash
the party; they insist, as it were, on continuing to earn extraordinary re-
turns and act as though they can readily repeat their earlier feats else-
where. If aspirations are dominated by social comparison ðAm I doing
better than my peers?Þ, by contrast, pioneers remain with the popular in-
novation longer since they serve large numbers of ﬁrst-mover clients as well
as a diminishing percentage of latecomers. Their “commitment” to the in-
novation increases average corporate outcomes and improves the chances
that community-wide success stories will continue to be generated, which re-
tards the exit of ﬁrms while maintaining the inward ﬂow. Where consul-
tants are guided by social aspirations, bandwagons are thus more extensive
and more durable; where consultants are guided by historical aspirations,
bandwagons are smaller and shorter-lived.
Mimic probabilities.—A third behavioral factor of interest is the pro-
pensity of actors to emulate their top-performing peers. If p_mimicc is close
to one, the great majority of dissatisﬁed consultants ﬂock to the most re-
cent success story; if it lies close to zero, most draw randomly from the pool
of possible innovations. As in the above discussion of consulting volatility
versus inertia, we once again have an opposition reminiscent of March’s
ð1991Þ analysis of exploration versus exploitation. Random selection from
the innovation pool is a form of exploration while mimetic adoption is a253
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Altype of exploitation ðbased on the reproduction of success via vicarious
learningÞ.
Figure 7 shows that faddish dynamics diminish when consultants are
less imitative ði.e., small p_mimiccÞ. As we have seen, it is supply-side mim-
icry that prompts the inﬂow of consultants into popular innovations, with
substantial costs for the pioneers who jump-started the wave and subse-
quently for ﬁrms. High levels of p_mimicc accelerate these invasive move-
ments, while low levels lead them to occur glacially. Note that collective
dynamics are stable over most of the parameter’s range. Only whenmimicry
is quite low ð< 20%Þ does faddishness markedly decline.
Firms also beneﬁt in a second way when p_mimicc is small. As shown
above, low rates of mimicry imply high collective levels of exploration.
When consultants randomly draw from the innovation pool, they some-
times uncover previously unknown innovations, a feat that mimics never
accomplish. This exploratory behavior in turn makes a more diverse set of
innovations accessible to ﬁrms, a service that is most valuable at higher
levels of the parameter for innovation merit. As a increases, the chance
that an explorer will uncover a diamond in the rough grows, and average
corporate outcomes rise accordingly.
It is of interest that exploration/exploitation works in the opposite di-
rection where ﬁrms are concerned. While mimicry by consultants tends to
undercut bandwagons, mimicry of superior performance on the demandFIG. 7.—Consultant mimicry and innovation turnover ðaverage values across levels
of p_mimiccÞ.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionside makes bandwagons last longer. Firms that explore virgin territory
rather than emulate their peers fail to coalesce around success stories, gen-
erating an innovation landscape in which no one innovation is popular.
And since bandwagons generally arise around high-performing innova-
tions or high-quality consultants, demand-side outcomes generally improve
as p_mimicf increases.
Matching ﬁrms and consultants.—In the computational experiments
conducted above, ﬁrms select consultants on the basis of their clients’ aver-
age outcomes. This seems reasonable given the ﬁrm’s strong incentive to
hire high-quality consultants, a drive that is presumably dampened but not
extinguished by the consultant’s interest in protecting client conﬁdential-
ity. To evaluate model robustness, we consider two more extreme match-
ing rules: onemore discerning, the other less discerning. In themore discern-
ing formulation, the attractiveness of consultants is proportional to their
true quality, as if ﬁrms peeked at our Java code before deciding which con-
sultant to partner with. In the less discerning rule, ﬁrms and consultants
are randomly matched, as though demand-side actors were unable to make
any outcome-based distinctions between providers.
Figure 8 shows the consequences of these matching rules alongside the
outcome-proportional rule we have used so far. To clarify the implications
for model robustness, we chart turnover across noise for each rule under
two conditions: a world where outcomes are driven by consultant qual-
ity and a world where outcomes are driven by innovation merit. This re-
produces the structure of the comparison in ﬁgure 4, allowing us to see
how faddish cycles are inﬂuenced by the way consultants and ﬁrms are
matched.FIG. 8.—Matching rules and innovation turnover ðaverage values across noise for
different matching rules and outcome regimesÞ.
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AlFigure 8 shows that differences in matching rules are overshadowed
by the contrast between consultant- and merit-driven innovation. The up-
per three curves characterize consultant-driven innovation under random,
outcome-proportional, and quality-proportional matching, while the three
lower-lying curves result from worlds where innovations rather than con-
sultants matter. Among the consultant-driven worlds, random matching pro-
duces the highest levels of turnover while matchings based on true quality
and outcomes are virtually indistinguishable. But all three lead to greater
faddishness than in worlds that are merit driven. The gap is largest under
noisy conditions ðthe left of the graphÞ and falls only when corporate out-
comes are virtually determined by choice of innovation and consultant.11
This robustness ﬂows from the basic dynamic that we have stressed
throughout: lower-quality consultants invade boom markets and spur the
exit of both ﬁrms and high-quality pioneers. When ﬁrms are undiscrimi-
nating ðthe random match conditionÞ, booms are especially fragile, since
market pioneers have no special advantage over new entrants in acquir-
ing additional clients. When ﬁrms are more discriminating, booms are less
fragile and effective market invasion occurs more slowly; but it ultimately
occurs nevertheless. Since the boom market remains a magnet for dissatis-
ﬁed providers under all matching conditions, the pressure of new entrants
simply builds to a higher level before it prompts an outﬂow of pioneers.
The contrast between consultant- and merit-driven innovation thus ob-
tains unless either ðaÞ consultants fail to move toward burgeoning market
opportunities or ðbÞ entrants are unable to gain market share. These are ex-
treme cases but telling ones. Two parameterizations leading to supply-side
immobility were noted above: where aspiration levels are so low as to ﬁx
consultants to their original innovation or where consultants are so non-
mimetic that almost all explore the innovation space rather than converg-
ing on popular innovations. Inability of supply-side entrants to gain market
share would arise if all mimetic adopters contracted with the same high-
scoring consultant, treating the provider rather than the innovation as the11Two additional speciﬁcation analyses were conducted that we describe brieﬂy. In the
ﬁrst, client/provider matches could be revised without the ﬁrm or consultant leaving
the innovation, which increases faddishness by making the market position of pioneers
highly variable and thus a source of dissatisfaction and exit. In the second, consultant
quality was treated as a variable that rises with innovation experience. Following the learn-
ingcurveliterature ðArgoteandEpple1990Þ,weassumedq=dt5 kðLi 2 qÞ, which implies
that qit 5 Li 2 ðLi 2 qi0Þexpð2k  tiÞ, where qi0 is a consultant’s initial quality, qit its
quality with an innovation after ti rounds, Li its maximum potential quality, and k
the learning rate. Overall levels of faddishness were not much affected by variation
across k. Late adopters eventually catch up ðon averageÞ with early movers since all
learners approach an asymptotic level of quality, keeping the overall level of intra-
consulting competition rather stable.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionsuccess story. In this scenario, mimetic and nonmimetic movers have
equally low probabilities of gaining clients, and burgeoning markets are
not undercut by supply-side mobility.
Consequences for consultants.—We have focused above on the way
model parameters inﬂuence the collective trajectories and outcomes of
ﬁrms. What about the ﬂip side? How do the parameter shifts described
above affect consultants?
The answer is remarkably consistent across the model variations con-
sidered here. To the extent that a behavioral shift reduces faddishness,
it generally increases the market share of high-quality consultants. If
consultants experiment rather than mimic, for example, there is a wider
distribution of providers across innovations and consequently more op-
portunity for ﬁrms to contract with high-quality consultants without run-
of-the-mill providers spoiling the party. Similarly, the ability of ﬁrms to
better discriminate between high- and low-quality consultants leads to a
higher proportion of clients for the consulting elite. We tracked one-, two-,
four-, and eight-consultant concentration ratios across conditions and found
that these rise with immobility, the weight of social versus historical aspi-
rations, rates of experimentation versus mimicry, and matching rules that
improve the ability of ﬁrms to distinguish higher- versus lower-quality con-
sultants. The net rewards to consultants do not change much in these condi-
tions, but the tendency for a few providers to enjoy the lion’s share of the
market is enhanced.
Supply-sidemarket concentrationappearspotentially problematic, though
computational analysis of the likely consequences would require further
elaboration of the agent-based model. From the ﬁrm’s perspective, consul-
tants that gain large numbers of clients may not be able to serve them effec-
tively, particularly if demand rises too rapidly for the provider to expand its
capacity. From the perspective of consultants, those who ﬁnd themselves
frozen out of red-hot markets are not likely to passively accept their fate.
They are motivated to take countermeasures: low-quality/unsuccessful con-
sultants may reﬁne their capacity to sense incipient shifts in market de-
mand, focus their efforts on exploitation to the exclusion of experimenta-
tion, and duplicate the visible characteristics of high-quality consultants.
The three-way Red Queen’s race between high-quality consultants hungry
to preserve returns commensurate with their capacities, low-quality con-
sultants hungry for market share, and ﬁrms hungry for superior perfor-
mance seems unlikely to settle down into a stable scenario in which a few
consultants reap all the rewards.1212The empirical level of market concentration in management consulting is modest,
with four- and eight-ﬁrm concentration ratios equaling 11% and 15%, respectively, based
on revenue data for NAICS code 541611 ðadministrative management and general man-
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AlDISCUSSION
This article adds to the already large literature on boundedly rational mod-
els of innovation/diffusion. The Carnegie school ðMarch and Simon 1958;
Cyert and March 1963Þ developed a broad critique of choice-theoretic for-
mulations that posit maximization of utility across alternatives, noting their
heroic assumptions about knowledge and calculating capacity. They con-
tended that managers who are “intendedly rational, but boundedly so” could
more plausibly employ simple rules that are consistent with cognitive con-
straints. The Carnegie school’s powerful insight provides the basis of formal
models of information cascades, where actors base decisions on signals pro-
vided by the behavior of others ðBanerjee 1992; Bikchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch 1992Þ, and vicarious learning, where actors base decisions on
outcomes elsewhere ðHaunschild and Miner 1997; Strang and Macy 2001Þ.
Working within the vicarious learning tradition, this article explicitly
models innovation supply as well as innovation demand. Despite the bur-
geoning role of consultants, advisers, and experts across many domains, we
are unaware of formal models of innovation/diffusion that represent both
sides to the exchange as active agents.13 In the version of adaptive emulation
formulated here, members of the two populations follow exemplars of their
own species: consultants mimic the most successful consultant while ﬁrms
mimic the most successful ﬁrm. Resource dependencies lead the choices of
demand- and supply-side actors to inﬂuence each other and thus coevolve.
We have focused on the implications of this coevolutionary framework
for faddish cycles—a commonly observed phenomenon in the management
world, but one in which the role of consultants is not well theorized. Much
research develops a critical perspective on consultancy, contending that
supply-side providers foist empty practices on their gullible demand-side
counterparts. The image of consultants as rhetorically skilled charlatans
and managers as their dupes has some warrant in empirical observation but
is conceptually problematic as an explanation of managerial fashion. If man-13White’s ð2002Þ model of production markets also posits variable-quality suppli-
ers who monitor their peers rather than their exchange partners. But White’s interest
centers on the construction of a stable role structure in which players of differential
quality occupy distinct niches rather than ðas hereÞ the ebb and ﬂow of popular prac-
tices.
agement consulting servicesÞ from the U.S. Census Bureau ð2007Þ. This undercuts the
plausibility of model parameterizations that sharply limit supply-side competition and
thereby faddishness, since the demand for consulting would then be monopolized by a
few providers. If we set noise to 0.5, e.g., simulations in which all mimetic adopters con-
vergeon the single most successful consultant lead a single provider to garner more than
60% of all contracts, a de facto monopoly that is out of line with the distribution of con-
sultants across clients that we see in the corporate world.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionagers running billion-dollar businesses are disabled by anxiety and lacking
in causal insight, why aren’t they replaced by million-dollar consultants who
would do a better job?
The model presented here offers an alternative explanatory framework.
Competitive dynamics among consultants of variable quality generate in-
stability even though both demand- and supply-side actors face equivalent
cognitive constraints. The key driver is not the service provider’s wizardry
but her mobility. Innovations that attract supernormal demand attract a
feeding frenzy of increasingly mediocre consultants, a form of market in-
vasion that generates a management version of Gresham’s law. Bad con-
sultants drive out good; thosewho built the boommarket react to the feeding
frenzy by differentiating their product in hopes of locating a new niche.
Consultant-driven innovation is robustly faddish because it combines a mech-
anism that makes popularity go up ðlocal concentrations of high-quality con-
sultants seeking to differentiate their product from that of their rivalsÞwith
a mechanism that makes popularity go down ðinﬂows of low-quality con-
sultants hungry for a share of the boom market and intent on eradicating
the distinction between themselves and the pioneersÞ. A real-world exem-
plar of managerial fashion, business process reengineering, suggests the
plausibility of these dynamics while reminding us of the complexity of real-
world fashion cycles ðDavid and Strang ½2006 demonstrate a similar dy-
namic for total quality managementÞ.
Computational experiments provide further insight by identifying pa-
rameter shifts that inﬂuence the level of faddishness. We see less faddish
behavior when consultants are more inertial, when their aspirations center
on social comparisons rather than historical ones, when they are less im-
itative and more exploratory, and when ﬁrms are better able to discern un-
derlying differentials in consultant quality. While collective trajectories are
inﬂuenced by these parameter shifts, the model is robust in the sense that
worlds where consultants are central to outcomes are always more fad-
dish than ones driven by innovation merit. Parameter shifts affect the
speed with which boom markets are invaded but do not eliminate the
mechanism traced here; competitive pressure builds until it hastens the exit
of market pioneers.
We should note that shifts in behavioral parameters are not well viewed
as straightforward “technical ﬁxes,” since they come at the cost of height-
ened market concentration and an accelerating struggle between higher-
and lower-quality providers. Real-world strategies to reduce faddishness
often have a political character, relying on collective or authoritative action
to shape individual choice. For example, invasion of boom markets by
inexperienced and underresourced consultants can be restricted by cre-
dentialing schemes that demand evidence of the new entrant’s expertise.259
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AlUnderlying quality can be made more visible to buyers by publishing the
provider’s qualiﬁcations or track record.14 Even the propensity to utilize
socially rather than historically deﬁned aspirations is inﬂuenced by factors
such as the dissemination of industrywide performance data.
Given the sizable distributional beneﬁts at stake, real-world actors
maneuver to construct advantageous institutional rules and norms. While
some such battles lead supply-side actors to join forces against outsiders
such as consumers or the state, in other cases the interests of high- and low-
quality supply-siders come into conﬂict. In our model, for example, lower-
quality consultants have an interest in opposing rigorous certiﬁcation schemes
and the publication of performance data. Higher-quality consultants ðwho
are not always the most successful consultantsÞ should favor these practices.
While we have focused on the dramatic case of management consult-
ing, the coevolutionary framework presented here may prove useful in the
analysis of a variety of domains. Service providers—conceptualized by
Meyer and Jepperson ð2000Þ as rationalized “others”—are on the rise.
They play key roles in domains such as politics and schooling as well as
individual-level behavioral change. For example, the contemporary ed-
ucational landscape is characterized by a large and growing population of
experts who advocate reform and assist teachers and schools in adopting
new practices, as well as an even more rapidly growing consulting sector
that provides services to students and their families ðtutoring, college prep-
aration, and assistance in composing the “perfect” personal statementÞ. The
ﬁeld is also rife with the rise and fall of pedagogical, curricular, and ad-
ministrative innovations ðthe new math, reform mathematics, common core,
the testing movement, assessment, phonics, whole language, ﬂexible sched-
uling, and the likeÞ. The model developed here has potential application to
these and other settings, insofar as they satisfy the general preconditions for
adaptive emulation ðperformance orientation, causal ambiguity, and publicly
available success storiesÞ plus differentiation and mobility on the supply
side.
To sum up, the central ﬁnding of this study is that supply-side actors can
foster faddishness even when both they and their clients are boundedly
rational agents who emulate their most successful peers. Our claim is not14There has been a longstanding debate among consultants and those who study them
regarding such schemes—a debate that often turns on the status of management consult-
ing as a profession. An early critic observed that management consulting is “an amor-
phous umbrella that anybody can get under, with no price of admission” such as licensing,
certiﬁcation, or professional requirements ðHigdon 1969, pp. 28, 32–33Þ. Recent contribu-
tions to this discussion note the low membership in credentialing associations, absence of
speciﬁc educational requirements, lack of occupational closure, and unclear standards
against which to judge consulting performance ðKubr 2002, pp. 131–32; Kirkpatrick,
Muzio, and Ackroyd 2012Þ.
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Coevolution in Management Fashionthat notions of consulting wizardry and managerial gullibility are logically
unsound but that they are optional rather than required elements of a
supply-side account of management fashion. The market-seeking mobil-
ity of providers who vary in intrinsic quality provides a well-deﬁned mech-
anism that robustly generates booms and busts in the adoption and aban-
donment of innovations.REFERENCES
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